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The OCC’s and FDIC’s Attempts to Confer 
Banking Privileges on Nonbanks and Commercial 
Firms Violate Federal Laws and Are Contrary to 
Public Policy
By Arthur E. Wilmarth, Jr.
Introduction
This article criticizes recent e!orts by the O"ce 
of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) and the 
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) to con-
fer the bene#ts and privileges of banks on nonbank pro-
viders of #nancial services (hereinafter “nonbanks”) and 
commercial #rms without requiring those entities to 
comply with the laws and regulations that govern banks 
and bank holding companies. As shown below, the 
OCC’s and FDIC’s initiatives are unlawful and contrary 
to the public interest. They are dangerous measures that 
would enable nonbanks and commercial #rms to sub-
vert important public policies embodied in our federal 
statutory framework for banking institutions. Congress 
should overturn the OCC’s and FDIC’s actions or per-
suade the agencies to rescind them.
In July 2018, the OCC announced its intention to 
approve national bank charters for nondepository “#n-
tech” #rms that provide lending or payment services but 
do not accept deposits. The New York Department of 
Financial Services (NYDFS) promptly #led a lawsuit to 
challenge the OCC’s action. In May 2019, a federal dis-
trict court held that the OCC lacked authority to grant 
national bank charters to #nancial institutions that do 
not accept deposits. The OCC has appealed that decision 
to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit.1
Despite the district court’s decision, Acting 
Comptroller of the Currency Brian Brooks stated in 
August 2020 that the OCC was ready to “start process-
ing applications for [nondepository national bank] char-
ters from payments companies . . . . These could include 
#nancial technology #rms like PayPal or cryptocur-
rency exchanges like Coinbase, his former employer.” 
Big technology #rms responded with enthusiasm to Mr. 
Brooks’ announcement. “Financial Innovation Now – 
a group that represents Amazon, Apple, Google, Intuit, 
PayPal, Square and Stripe – praised Brooks’ ‘leadership 
and vision’ in a statement.”2
In March 2020, the FDIC issued a proposed rule that 
would allow all types of commercial #rms—including 
the largest technology #rms—to acquire FDIC-insured 
industrial banks and industrial loan companies (herein-
after collectively referred to as “ILCs”).3 If implemented, 
that rule could potentially transform our #nancial sys-
tem and economy. Unlike the OCC’s nondepository 
#ntech charter, the FDIC’s proposed ILC rule would 
permit Big Tech giants and other commercial #rms to 
own FDIC-insured, deposit-taking institutions. The 
proposed ILC rule would also enable commercial own-
ers of ILCs to avoid the limitations and obligations 
that apply to parent companies of FDIC-insured banks 
under the Bank Holding Company Act (BHC Act).
FDIC-insured ILCs have presumptive access to dis-
count window loans, payment and settlement services, 
and other facilities and bene#ts that depository institu-
tions receive from the Federal Reserve System (Fed). In 
contrast, as discussed below in Part 1.b, the Fed has not 
yet taken any position on whether the OCC’s nonde-
pository #ntech national banks would qualify for access 
to the Fed’s services and facilities.
The OCC has taken two additional steps to confer 
privileges of national banks on nonbank #rms. In June 
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2020, the OCC adopted a rule declaring that national 
banks can transfer their federal preemptive immunity 
from state usury laws to nonbanks that are purchasers, 
assignees, or transferees of their loans. The OCC’s usury 
preemption transfer rule is designed to shield those non-
banks from all state usury laws except for the usury laws 
of the state where the national bank that transferred the 
loans is “located.”4 Most national banks “locate” their 
lending operations in states that have few if any usury 
limits. Consequently, the OCC’s rule e!ectively grants 
blanket immunity from state usury laws to nonbanks 
that acquire loans from national banks.5
In July 2020, the OCC issued a proposed rule that 
would (1) allow national banks to form “partnerships” 
with nonbank lenders, (2) treat national banks as the “true 
lenders” for all loans produced by such “partnerships” if 
the banks are named as the lenders in the loan agree-
ments or fund the loans, and (3) permit national banks 
to maintain their status as “true lenders” even if they sell 
their entire interest in those loans to their nonbank “part-
ners” one day after the loans are made. The OCC’s proposed 
“true lender” rule would permit national banks to estab-
lish “rent-a-charter” schemes with high-cost nonbank 
lenders. “Rent-a-charter” schemes enable banks to earn 
fees by selling their federal preemptive immunity from 
state laws to their nonbank “partners,” while the nonbank 
“partners” assume all or most of the economic bene#ts 
and risks of the loans generated by the “partnerships.”6
In July 2020, the FDIC issued a rule allowing FDIC-
insured state banks to transfer their federal preemptive 
immunity from state usury laws to purchasers, assignees, 
and transferees of their loans. The FDIC’s rule grants 
FDIC-insured state banks the same authority to transfer 
their preemptive immunity from state usury laws that 
national banks are given under the OCC’s usury pre-
emption transfer rule.7 The FDIC has not yet proposed 
a regulation similar to the OCC’s “true lender” rule.
Part 1 of this article shows that the OCC’s nonde-
pository #ntech national bank charter and the FDIC’s 
proposed ILC rule are contrary to federal statutes and 
policies governing banks and bank holding compa-
nies. Part 2 demonstrates that the OCC’s and FDIC’s 
attempts to confer on nonbanks the preemptive immu-
nities granted to banks by Congress violate federal laws 
and threaten to impose serious injuries on states, con-
sumers, and small businesses.
Analysis
1. The OCC’s nondepository fintech charter 
and the FDIC’s proposed ILC rule violate 
federal laws and undermine important public 
policies
Several federal banking statutes prohibit the OCC 
from granting national bank charters to #nancial insti-
tutions that do not accept deposits. In addition, the 
OCC’s nondepository #ntech national bank charter and 
the FDIC’s proposed ILC rule contravene fundamental 
principles established by federal banking laws, includ-
ing the policies of separating banking and commerce, 
avoiding signi#cant risks to #nancial stability, preventing 
serious threats to competition, and protecting consum-
ers and communities.
a. The National Bank Act requires national banks 
to accept deposits in order to engage in the 
“business of banking”
Congress passed the National Bank Act of 1864 
(NBA) to establish a uniform national currency in the 
form of bank notes issued by a newly-created system of 
national banks.8 The NBA also helped the federal gov-
ernment to #nance the Civil War by requiring national 
banks to purchase and hold government bonds as liquid-
ity reserves for their liabilities created by bank notes and 
deposits.9 The NBA required every national bank to hold 
federal government bonds and other “lawful money of 
the United States” in an amount equal to a speci#ed 
percentage of “its notes in circulation and its deposits.”10
Since 1864, deposit-taking has been an essential part 
of the “business of banking” conducted by national 
banks. From its inception, the NBA has authorized the 
OCC to issue national bank charters only if the OCC 
determines that each proposed national bank “is law-
fully entitled to commence the business of banking.”11 
The NBA has always de#ned “the business of banking” 
as including “receiving deposits,” making loans, paying 
(“discounting”) negotiable instruments and other evi-
dences of debt, buying and selling “bullion” and for-
eign exchange, and obtaining and issuing circulating 
bank notes, together with “all such incidental powers as 
shall be necessary to carry on the business of banking.”12 
Since 1864, the NBA has required every national bank 
to identify in its organization certi#cate “[t]he place 
where its operations of discount and deposit are to be 
carried on.”13
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The NBA’s designation of deposit-taking as an indis-
pensable component of “the business of banking” re$ects 
the crucial roles that bank deposits play in our mone-
tary system and economy. Bank deposits increase our 
nation’s money supply. Banks use deposits to fund their 
extensions of credit and their purchases of investment 
securities.14 Businesses and consumers use bank deposits 
as vehicles for saving and for making payments to oth-
ers. Under federal law, only banks and other chartered 
depository institutions are allowed to accept deposits.15
Thus, bank deposits are of central importance to the 
e!ective operation of our monetary system and our 
economy.16 Federal courts have repeatedly identi#ed 
deposit-taking as an “essential” aspect of the “business of 
banking” authorized by the NBA and other federal stat-
utes.17 The power to accept deposits is a special privilege 
conferred by federal and state governments on banks 
and other depository institutions through a demanding 
chartering process. That special privilege warrants the 
comprehensive regime of regulation and supervision 
that federal and state governments impose on banks and 
other depository institutions.18
In 1975, the OCC took the unprecedented step 
of granting a national bank charter to a special-pur-
pose trust company. That trust company did not accept 
deposits other than trust funds and did not exercise any 
other non#duciary powers. A district court invalidated 
the OCC’s special-purpose trust charter, holding that it 
violated the NBA’s requirement that all national banks 
must engage in the “business of banking.”19
In response to that court decision, Congress 
amended Section 27(a) of the NBA in 1978. The 1978 
amendment speci#cally permitted the OCC to approve 
national bank charters for special-purpose, nondeposi-
tory trust companies.20 Based on that narrowly-tailored 
amendment, a federal appellate court reversed the dis-
trict court’s decision and upheld the OCC’s special-pur-
pose trust charter.21
Congress’s 1978 amendment to Section 27(a) con-
#rms that the NBA does not allow the OCC to approve 
nondepository charters for national banks other than spe-
cial-purpose trust companies.22 If the OCC possessed a 
general power to charter nondepository national banks, 
the 1978 amendment to Section 27(a) would have been 
redundant and unnecessary surplusage. Under two 
well-established canons of statutory construction—the 
canon against surplusage and the associated canon of 
expressio unius est exclusio alterius (the naming of one 
thing excludes other similar things), the narrowly-con-
#ned terms of the 1978 amendment refute the OCC’s 
assertion of a general authority to charter nondeposi-
tory national banks.23
The OCC rests its claim of authority to charter non-
depository national banks on Section 36 of the NBA. 
However, Section 36 was not added to the NBA until 
1927—more than 60 years after the NBA’s enactment. 
Section 36 deals only with the authority of national 
banks to establish branches. Section 36 says nothing 
about the chartering of banks, and it does not refer to 
“the business of banking.” The OCC did not assert any 
chartering authority under Section 36 until 2003, and 
the OCC did not take any de#nitive steps to exercise 
that claimed authority until 2016.24
Section 36 de#nes a “branch” as a location “at which 
deposits are received, or checks paid, or money lent.”25 
Based on the disjunctive word “or” in Section 36, the 
OCC contends that it can charter national banks that 
engage in lending or payment activities but do not accept 
deposits. However, a branch is a subset of a national bank, 
and Section 36 merely authorizes a branch to exercise 
a subset of “the business of banking.” The fact that a 
national bank may lawfully establish a subsidiary branch 
without accepting deposits has no bearing on whether 
the OCC may lawfully charter a bank that does not 
accept deposits.
In contrast to Section 36, Section 24 (Seventh) of 
the NBA uses the conjunctive word “and” when it 
identi#es the activities that are part of “the business of 
banking”—including “receiving deposits.” The activities 
speci#ed in Section 24 (Seventh) include all three of the 
functions listed in Section 36. Viewed in combination 
with the 1978 amendment to Section 27(a) and Section 
22 (Second)—which requires every national bank to 
identify “[t]he place where its operations of discount 
and deposit are to be carried on”—Section 24 (Seventh) 
bars the OCC from chartering nondepository national 
banks other than special-purpose trust companies.26
As the district court explained in Vullo, the OCC’s 
nondepository #ntech national bank charter could have 
a major “impact . . . on at least ‘a signi#cant portion’ of 
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the national economy” by causing a “dramatic disrup-
tion of federal-state relationships in the banking indus-
try.” Nonbanks could avoid state licensing, reporting, and 
supervisory requirements by obtaining #ntech charters 
from the OCC. Recipients of the OCC’s #ntech char-
ters could also claim that the NBA preempts numerous 
state consumer protection laws (including state usury 
laws) that currently apply to nonbank providers of lend-
ing and payment services.27 The OCC could conceiv-
ably assert that recipients of #ntech charters do not have 
to comply with state privacy and data protection laws.28 
Thus, the OCC’s #ntech charter would abrogate the 
longstanding federal policy of allowing states to regulate 
nonbanks that provide #nancial services within their 
borders.29
The OCC’s #ntech charter would severely impair 
the states’ historic authority to enact and enforce laws 
that protect their residents against abusive, deceptive, 
and exploitative practices by nonbank providers of 
lending and payment services. As the NYDFS pointed 
out in its Complaint in Vullo, “preemption of state law 
governing mortgage lenders and servicers” by the OCC 
and the O"ce of Thrift Supervision (OTS) during the 
1990s and 2000s “was a root cause of the global #nancial 
collapse,” along with failures by the OCC, OTS, and 
other federal regulators to protect consumers against 
predatory lending and foreclosure practices.30 Congress 
should not allow the OCC to repeat its disastrous pat-
tern of preemptive overreach and regulatory laxity that 
contributed signi#cantly to the catastrophic events of 
2007–09.
The OCC’s #ntech chartering initiative o!ers fed-
eral corporate charters to a wide range of nonbank 
#rms that provide lending and payment services. Big 
Tech giants like Alphabet (Google), Amazon, Apple, 
Facebook, and Microsoft could potentially obtain OCC 
#ntech charters if they established signi#cant lending or 
payment programs. Currently, Big Tech giants and other 
nonbanks must operate under state corporate charters 
and must comply with state corporate governance laws. 
The OCC’s attempt to expand its federal chartering 
authority beyond deposit-taking national banks is inde-
fensible in view of numerous court decisions that refused 
to construe federal statutes in a manner that would 
override “established state policies of corporate regu-
lation” absent clear evidence of congressional intent.31 
As shown above, Congress has never expressed an intent 
to allow the OCC to grant national bank charters to 
nondepository #rms except for special-purpose trust 
companies.
b. The Federal Reserve Act confirms that national 
banks must be depository institutions
The Federal Reserve Act of 1913 (FRA) established 
the Fed as the nation’s new monetary authority. In cre-
ating the Fed, Congress sought to provide a “sound” 
and “$exible” national currency in the form of Federal 
Reserve notes. Federal Reserve notes gradually replaced 
the “bond-secured note[s]” issued by national banks 
under the NBA.32 Congress also directed the Fed to 
clear and pay (at par) checks drawn by depositors on 
national banks and state banks that were members of the 
Fed (state member banks).33 The Fed’s duty to clear and 
pay checks re$ected the fact that bank deposits were a 
major component of the U.S. money supply by 1913.
The FRA provides that Federal Reserve notes 
must be “receivable by all national and [state] member 
banks.”34 Congress included that mandate to ensure that 
Federal Reserve notes would be “payable . . . to any 
[member] bank for deposit purposes,” thereby making 
each member bank a “quasi-redemption” facility for 
those notes.35 The obligation of all Fed member banks 
to accept Federal Reserve notes as deposits demon-
strated Congress’s understanding that all member banks 
would be depository institutions.
Since 1913, the FRA has required every national 
bank to become a Fed member bank and to purchase 
stock in its respective regional Federal Reserve Bank. 
National banks that do not ful#ll those commitments 
must forfeit their charters.36 The FRA’s provisions 
requiring national banks to become member banks, to 
buy stock in their Federal Reserve Banks, and to accept 
Federal Reserve notes as deposits were key elements 
of the FRA’s design for an e!ective monetary system 
and national currency.37 Congress recognized that “the 
Federal Reserve System could not function without 
national banks, which are required to be members 
therein, 12 U.S.C. § 222, and in that sense, they are part 
and parcel of the establishment and e!ectuation of the 
national #scal and monetary policies.”38
National banks and other federally-regulated deposi-
tory institutions play signi#cant roles in the Fed’s imple-
mentation of monetary policy. National banks and other 
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depository institutions must maintain reserves against 
their deposits in accordance with the Fed’s regulations.39 
Bank reserve requirements are one of the “primary 
means through which the [Federal Reserve] System 
implements monetary policy.”40 Other important tools 
for implementing the Fed’s monetary policy—includ-
ing open-market operations and discount window 
loans—also operate through the Fed’s relationships and 
transactions with national banks and other depository 
institutions.41
The Fed frequently changes its monetary policy 
stance by adjusting its target for the federal funds rate—
the interest rate at which depository institutions borrow 
from and lend to each other in the overnight federal 
funds market. To in$uence the federal funds rate, the 
Fed changes the interest rate that it pays on reserve bal-
ances maintained by depository institutions in excess 
of their required reserves.42 Thus, national banks and 
other depository institutions serve as a vitally important 
“transmission belt for monetary policy.”43
National banks and other depository institutions 
enjoy a privileged relationship with the Fed, and they 
receive highly bene#cial services from the Fed. The 
Fed provides loans to depository institutions through 
the discount window. The Fed also permits depository 
institutions to establish master accounts that give them 
access to the Fed’s real-time payment system (Fedwire) 
and its securities custody and settlement services.44
As shown above, the FRA embodies Congress’s clear 
understanding that national banks must be depository 
institutions to ful#ll their intended functions within the 
Fed. The OCC’s nondepository #ntech national bank 
charter directly con$icts with Congress’s design for 
the Fed. Nondepository #ntech national banks could 
argue that they are automatically eligible to become 
Fed member banks and must receive the same bene#ts 
and services that the Fed provides to depository mem-
ber banks.45 The Fed has not yet expressed any view 
on whether it would recognize nondepository #ntech 
national banks as Fed member banks.46
If nondepository #ntech national banks achieved 
recognition as Fed member banks, they would imme-
diately qualify for loans from the Fed’s discount win-
dow. Such an outcome would undermine the crucial 
distinction that Congress has established between the 
broad support that the Fed can provide to depository 
institutions through the discount window and the much 
more limited assistance that the Fed can give to non-
depository #rms. Under Section 13(3) of the FRA, as 
amended in 2010, “nondepository institutions” may 
receive loans from the Fed only (1) in “unusual and 
exigent circumstances,” (2) pursuant to a program or 
facility creating “broad-based eligibility” for nondeposi-
tory borrowers that are “not insolvent,” and (3) with the 
approval of the Secretary of the Treasury and a superma-
jority of the Federal Reserve Board.47 Allowing nonde-
pository #ntech national banks to obtain loans through 
the discount window would vitiate Congress’s policy of 
imposing signi#cant constraints on the Fed’s authority 
to provide loans to nondepository #rms.
If nondepository #ntech national banks became Fed 
member banks, they could also establish master accounts 
providing access to the Fed’s payment services (includ-
ing Fedwire) as well as the Fed’s custody and settlement 
services. Fedwire provides real-time payments and guar-
anteed #nality—important privileges that are currently 
available only to depository institutions. Depository 
institutions can also obtain intraday overdraft credit 
from the Fed.48 Granting nondepository #ntech national 
banks access to the Fed’s payment and settlement ser-
vices and overdraft credit would violate Congress’s 
intent that only depository institutions should receive 
such bene#ts and services under the FRA.
Access to the Fed’s bene#ts and services would give 
nondepository #ntech national banks major advantages 
over nonbank competitors that could not obtain char-
ters from the OCC. Allowing nondepository #ntech 
national banks to exploit such competitive advantages 
would be contrary to the public policies embodied in 
the NBA and FRA. In addition, as explained below in 
Part 1.d, the OCC’s #ntech charter would allow #n-
tech “banks” to evade a number of important regulatory 
requirements and public interest safeguards that apply to 
all FDIC-insured depository institutions and their par-
ent companies.
If nondepository #ntech national banks were recog-
nized as Fed member banks, Big Tech giants and other 
technology #rms could obtain a signi#cant voice in the 
formulation of U.S. monetary policy. National banks 
and state member banks elect six of the nine directors 
of each Federal Reserve Bank. Half of the directors 
6 • Banking & Financial Services Policy Report Volume 39 • Number 10 • October 2020
elected by member banks participate in selecting the 
presidents of the twelve Federal Reserve Banks. Five of 
those presidents serve as voting members of the Federal 
Open Market Committee (FOMC), which establishes 
the Fed’s monetary policy. The other seven presidents 
attend the FOMC’s meetings and participate in the 
FOMC’s discussions.49 Thus, Big Tech giants and other 
technology #rms could in$uence the FOMC’s deliber-
ations and decisions through their ownership of #ntech 
“banks” that participate in the selection of directors and 
presidents of Federal Reserve Banks. Allowing Big Tech 
giants and other technology #rms to wield such in$u-
ence would be contrary to the FRA’s design, which 
draws a fundamental distinction between depository 
institutions and all other #rms.
c. The Federal Deposit Insurance Act requires 
national banks to obtain federal deposit 
insurance
The Banking Acts of 1933 and 1935 created a 
new federal deposit insurance program and estab-
lished the FDIC to administer that program. The 1933 
and 1935 Acts mandated that all national banks must 
obtain deposit insurance from the FDIC.50 Similarly, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Act of 1950 (FDI Act) 
required every national bank “engaged in the business 
of receiving deposits other than trust funds” to obtain 
deposit insurance.51 National banks that fail to obtain 
deposit insurance must forfeit their charters.52
The OCC’s claim of plenary authority to charter 
nondepository national banks is negated by Congress’s 
explicit mandate that national banks must obtain deposit 
insurance. The only national banks that currently oper-
ate without deposit insurance are nondepository, spe-
cial-purpose trust companies.53 As explained above in 
Part 1.a, Congress speci#cally authorized the charter-
ing of those institutions under the 1978 amendment to 
Section 27(a) of the NBA.
The statutory requirement that all other national 
banks must obtain deposit insurance is consistent with 
Congress’s understanding that deposit-taking is an 
essential aspect of the “business of banking” under the 
NBA and the FRA. Both statutes identify deposit-tak-
ing as the crucial and dispositive activity that distin-
guishes banks from nonbanks. Indeed, Section 21(a)(2) 
of the Banking Act of 1933 imposes criminal penalties 
on any person who engages in “the business of receiving 
deposits” without being chartered and regulated as a 
depository institution.54
d. The OCC’s fintech charter and the FDIC’s 
proposed ILC rule threaten to undermine the 
BHC Act’s policy of separating banking and 
commerce
i. The BHC Act mandates the separation of banking and 
commerce
The BHC Act regulates all “companies” that control 
“banks.”55 The original BHC Act of 1956 applied to 
companies that controlled two or more banks. In 1970, 
Congress expanded the BHC Act’s scope to include all 
companies that control a single bank.56
Section 4 of the BHC Act prohibits banks from con-
trolling commercial #rms, and it also bars commercial 
#rms from controlling banks. Section 4 re$ects our 
nation’s “longstanding policy of separating banking 
from commerce.”57 The BHC Act prohibits a"liations 
between banks and commercial #rms because such 
combinations create signi#cant dangers, including (1) 
hazardous concentrations of economic and #nancial 
power, (2) con$icts of interest that would destroy the 
ability of banks to act objectively in providing loans and 
other services, and (3) unacceptable risks to the fed-
eral “safety net” for banks, including the FDIC’s deposit 
insurance fund, the Fed’s discount window, the Fed’s 
guarantees for interbank payments made on Fedwire, 
and the Fed’s overdraft credit facility for depository 
institutions.58
In 1970, Congress changed the BHC Act’s de#ni-
tion of “bank.” The 1970 amendment de#ned “bank” 
as a #nancial institution that accepted demand depos-
its (business checking accounts) and made commer-
cial loans. A decade later, the OCC began to charter 
“nonbank banks”—national banks that refrained from 
accepting demand deposits or from making commer-
cial loans. By forgoing one of those functions, nonbank 
banks enabled their parent companies to escape regu-
lation under the BHC Act. The OCC allowed many 
commercial #rms to acquire “nonbank banks,” thereby 
threatening the BHC Act’s policy of separating banking 
and commerce.59
In 1987, Congress closed the “nonbank bank loop-
hole” and strongly criticized the OCC’s e!orts to cir-
cumvent the BHC Act. As amended in 1987, the BHC 
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Act de#nes “bank” to include all FDIC-insured banks 
(as well as any other banks that accept demand deposits 
and make commercial loans), subject to narrowly-de-
#ned exceptions.60 The Senate committee report on the 
1987 legislation declared that “[n]onbank banks under-
mine the principle of separating banking and commerce, 
a policy that has long been the keystone of our banking 
system.” The report also explained that Congress was 
closing the nonbank bank loophole to “minimize the 
concentration of #nancial and economic resources” 
and improve “the safety and soundness of our #nancial 
system.”61
ii. The OCC’s fintech charter would allow technology firms 
to evade the BHC Act’s prohibition against combining 
banking and commerce
The OCC’s nondepository #ntech national bank 
charter is the OCC’s latest attempt to subvert the BHC 
Act’s policy of separating banking and commerce. As 
Congress made crystal clear in 1987, the OCC has no 
authority to create new types of national bank charters 
that permit combinations of banking and commerce. 
The 1987 amendments to the BHC Act shut down 
the OCC’s “nonbank bank” charter. The 1987 legisla-
tion gave nondepository, special-purpose trust compa-
nies a special exemption from the BHC Act’s de#nition 
of “bank.” However, that exemption is not available 
to special-purpose trust companies if they receive any 
discount window loans or payment services from the 
Fed.62
The OCC’s nondepository #ntech national bank 
charter would once again allow parent companies of 
chartered national banks to avoid regulation under the 
BHC Act. Nondepository #ntech national banks would 
not be FDIC-insured, would not accept demand depos-
its, and therefore would not be treated as “banks” under 
the BHC Act. Big Tech giants and other commercial 
#rms could acquire #ntech national banks and evade 
the BHC Act.
As discussed above in Part 1.b, nondepository #n-
tech national banks could potentially gain access to the 
bene#ts and services that the Fed provides to national 
banks—including discount window loans, payment 
and settlement services, guarantees for payments made 
on Fedwire, and overdraft credit. Under those circum-
stances, ownership of #ntech national banks by Big Tech 
giants and other commercial enterprises would expose 
major components of the federal safety net to the risks 
posed by their unregulated parent companies. That out-
come would severely undercut the BHC Act’s funda-
mental policy of separating banking and commerce to 
protect the federal safety net from risks and losses gen-
erated by commercial #rms.63
In addition to end-running the BHC Act, nonde-
pository #ntech national banks and their commercial 
owners would evade a number of other important reg-
ulatory requirements and public interest safeguards that 
apply to FDIC-insured depository institutions and their 
parent companies. For example, FDIC-insured deposi-
tory institutions and their parent companies must com-
ply with (a) capital requirements and other safety and 
soundness standards for depository institutions under 12 
U.S.C. §§ 1831p-1 and 3901-07; (b) prompt corrective 
action rules for depository institutions under 12 U.S.C. 
§ 1831o; (c) “source of strength” obligations for parent 
companies of depository institutions under 12 U.S.C. § 
1831o-1; (d) capital requirements for parent companies 
of depository institutions under 12 U.S.C. § 5371(b); 
(e) the FDIC’s conservatorship and receivership powers 
over depository institutions under 12 U.S.C. §§ 1821-
23; and (f) community service commitments for depos-
itory institutions under the Community Reinvestment 
Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3901-08.
The OCC’s nondepository #ntech national banks 
would not be subject to any of the foregoing require-
ments and safeguards because they would not be FDIC-
insured depository institutions.64 The OCC’s #ntech 
charter initiative is contrary to public policy because 
it would allow Big Tech #rms and other commercial 
enterprises to own national banks without comply-
ing with statutory requirements and public interest 
obligations that perform vital roles in supporting the 
soundness of our #nancial system and the health of our 
economy.
iii. The FDIC’s proposed ILC rule poses a grave threat to 
the separation of banking and commerce, the stability 
of our financial system, and the competitiveness of our 
economy
The FDIC’s proposed ILC rule poses an even greater 
threat to the BHC Act’s policy of separating banking 
and commerce. Unlike nondepository #ntech national 
banks, ILCs are FDIC-insured, state-chartered institu-
tions that are authorized to accept all types of deposits 
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except business checking accounts. The ILC charter is 
the only vehicle that arguably allows commercial #rms 
to own FDIC-insured depository institutions without 
violating the BHC Act.65
The FDIC’s proposed ILC rule states that “the indus-
trial bank exemption in the [BHC Act] . . . provides 
an avenue for commercial #rms to own or control a 
bank.”66 However, there is no evidence indicating that 
Congress intended or expected that the 1987 exemp-
tion for ILCs would lead to widespread acquisitions of 
ILCs by large commercial #rms. In 1987, ILCs were 
small, locally-focused institutions that o!ered deposit 
and credit services to lower- and middle-income house-
holds. ILCs held only $4.2 billion of assets in 1987, and 
the largest ILC had less than $420 million of assets. A 
1993 report from the Congressional Research Service 
(CRS) stated that ILCs played only a “minor” role in 
the U.S. #nancial system.67
In July 2005, Walmart, the largest U.S. retailer, applied 
to the FDIC for permission to acquire an FDIC-insured, 
Utah-chartered ILC. Walmart’s application triggered 
vigorous public opposition as well as extensive debates 
about the wisdom of allowing large commercial #rms 
to own ILCs. In April 2006, during one of the FDIC’s 
public hearings on Walmart’s application, Senator Jake 
Garn (R-UT)—who sponsored the 1987 exemption for 
ILCs—stated that “it was never my intent, as the author 
of this particular section, that any of these industrial 
banks be involved in retail [commercial] operations.”68
In response to the intense public opposition against 
Walmart’s application, the FDIC imposed a six-month 
moratorium in July 2006 on acquisitions of ILCs by 
commercial #rms. In its moratorium notice, the FDIC 
observed that the “evolution” of the “ILC industry” was 
occurring “in ways that may not have been anticipated 
at the time [Senator Garn’s exemption] was enacted in 
1987.” In January 2007, the FDIC extended its mora-
torium for an additional year. In doing so, the agency 
pointed out that “business plans” for ILCs owned by 
commercial #rms “di!er substantially from the con-
sumer lending focus of the original industrial banks.”69
Walmart withdrew its ILC application in March 
2007, due to the FDIC’s extended moratorium and 
unrelenting public hostility toward Walmart’s appli-
cation. The magnitude of the public outcry against 
Walmart’s proposed ILC—which included statements 
of opposition by many members of Congress—sup-
ported Senator Garn’s view that Walmart’s application 
went far beyond the intended scope of the exemption 
he sponsored in 1987.70
Senator Garn’s exemption was included in the 
Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987 (CEBA). 
As discussed above in Part 1.d.i, CEBA rea"rmed and 
strengthened Congress’s policy of separating banking 
and commerce by closing the nonbank bank loop-
hole. During the $oor debates on CEBA, members 
of Congress called for shutting down that loophole to 
preserve the separation of banking and commerce and 
ensure parity of regulatory treatment for all companies 
that controlled FDIC-insured banks.71
It is highly unlikely that Congress passed CEBA to 
rea!rm and strengthen the policy of separating banking 
and commerce by closing the nonbank bank loophole 
and, at the same time, wanted to undermine and weaken 
the same policy by adopting Senator Garn’s exemption 
for ILCs. The improbability of such a self-contradicting 
purpose is heightened by the absence of any evidence 
of a congressional understanding that Senator Garn’s 
exemption could be used to break down the barrier 
between banking and commerce. In 1999, Congress 
again reinforced the policy of separating banking and 
commerce by passing a statute that prohibited fur-
ther acquisitions of FDIC-insured savings associations 
by commercial #rms. In view of Congress’s powerful 
expressions of support for the policy of separating bank-
ing and commerce in 1987 and 1999, the unexplained 
text of Senator Garn’s exemption should not be con-
strued in a way that undermines that policy.72
The FDIC’s policy toward ILCs should adhere to 
Congress’s strongly articulated purpose of separating 
banking and commerce. The appropriate policy for the 
FDIC would be to allow acquisitions of ILCs by com-
panies engaged in #nancial activities but not by #rms 
engaged in commercial activities. The FDIC followed 
that policy when (1) it did not approve Walmart’s appli-
cation, (2) it imposed a moratorium on acquisitions 
of ILCs by commercial #rms between June 2006 and 
January 2008, and (3) it did not approve any acquisitions 
of ILCs by commercial #rms between the expiration of 
its moratorium in 2008 and March 2020. Unfortunately, 
on March 18, 2020—one day after the FDIC issued its 
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proposed ILC rule—the FDIC approved deposit insur-
ance applications for ILCs owned by Square and Nelnet. 
Square and Nelnet engage in both #nancial and non-
#nancial activities and would not qualify for status as 
bank holding companies under the BHC Act.73
The FDIC’s issuance of its proposed ILC rule and 
its approvals of Square’s and Nelnet’s applications rep-
resented a fundamental and undesirable change in the 
FDIC’s policy toward ILCs. If adopted, the proposed 
ILC rule would encourage many other technology and 
commercial #rms to acquire FDIC-insured ILCs.
For example, Rakuten recently renewed its applica-
tion to acquire an FDIC-insured ILC in Utah. Rakuten 
is a large Japanese company engaged in e-commerce, 
information technology, and other commercial activ-
ities. Rakuten’s global website states that it conducts 
“over 70 businesses across e-commerce, digital con-
tent, communications and #ntech,” ranging from “new 
open platforms for e-commerce, to experiments with 
drones, chatbots, deep learning and AI.” Rakuten’s web-
site also declares that “we challenge the status quo” and 
“embrace new and disruptive ideas.”74 If the FDIC 
allowed Rakuten to own an FDIC-insured ILC, Big 
Tech giants would almost certainly follow Rakuten’s 
example.
Permitting further acquisitions of ILCs by com-
mercial #rms would (i) greatly impair the policy of 
separating banking and commerce, (ii) create serious 
threats to competition and consumer welfare, (iii) gen-
erate a strong probability of imposing large losses on 
the federal safety net for #nancial institutions during 
future systemic crises, and (iv) pose grave dangers to 
the stability of our #nancial system and the health of 
our economy. Accordingly, further acquisitions of ILCs 
by commercial #rms would be contrary to the public 
interest factors that the FDIC must consider when it 
acts on applications for deposit insurance or acquisitions 
of FDIC-insured banks. Under the FDI Act, the FDIC 
must take a negative view of such transactions if they 
would increase the risk of losses to the federal deposit 
insurance fund, have harmful e!ects on competition or 
communities, or pose serious risks to the stability of the 
U.S. banking and #nancial systems.75
The federal government bailed out several large cor-
porate owners of ILCs during the #nancial crisis of 
2007–09, including CIT Group, GE Capital, GMAC, 
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley. 
Those bailouts indicate the systemic dangers and public 
costs that are likely to arise if large commercial #rms 
acquire ILCs and combine the operations of those ILCs 
with their commercial activities. In addition, four large 
ILCs failed between 1999 and 2010 after engaging in 
predatory subprime lending, and three of those failures 
in$icted signi#cant losses on the FDIC’s deposit insur-
ance fund.76
Widespread ownership of ILCs by commercial #rms 
would greatly increase the likelihood of contagious 
spillovers of risks and losses between the #nancial sys-
tem and the general economy. During future #nancial 
crises and economic downturns, federal agencies would 
face intense pressures to rescue large commercial own-
ers of ILCs to ensure the stability of our #nancial system 
and economy. For example, the German technology 
#rm Wirecard was reportedly planning to pursue an 
acquisition of Deutsche Bank before Wirecard col-
lapsed following the revelation of its massive account-
ing fraud.77 Imagine the systemic crisis that could have 
occurred if Wirecard had acquired Deutsche Bank before 
its accounting fraud became known to regulators and 
the public.
FDIC-insured ILCs have full access to the federal 
safety net, including deposit insurance and the Fed’s dis-
count window loans, payment and settlement services, 
and overdraft credit. That access would give signi#cant 
competitive advantages to commercial #rms that own 
ILCs. In addition to the low-cost funding provided by 
ILC deposits and discount window loans, commercial 
owners would bene#t from implicit “catastrophe insur-
ance” in the form of expected federal support during 
future systemic crises. Allowing commercial #rms to 
own ILCs would create a highly skewed playing #eld 
favoring large enterprises that could a!ord to acquire 
ILCs and handicapping smaller #rms that could not.78
The #nancial industry and many commercial sectors 
of our economy (including the information technol-
ogy industry) already display very high levels of con-
centration and are dominated by a small number of 
giant #rms. Big incumbent #rms in those industries 
capture unjusti#ed super-pro#ts by using their mar-
ket power to impose unfair prices on customers and 
suppliers, by acquiring or crowding out smaller #rms, 
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and by deterring entry by new #rms.79 Allowing Big 
Tech giants and other large commercial #rms to acquire 
ILCs would give them an additional competitive edge, 
thereby further impairing competition and harming 
customers and suppliers in many lines of commerce.
iv. Acquisitions of ILCs and fintech national banks by 
commercial firms would impose serious costs on our 
economy and society
Acquisitions of ILCs and nondepository #ntech 
national banks by Big Tech giants and other commercial 
#rms would transform our #nancial system and econ-
omy in ways that are likely to have signi#cant adverse 
e!ects on taxpayers, consumers, and communities. Big 
Tech #rms already enjoy technological superiority over 
banks in the #elds of automation, arti#cial intelligence, 
data management, and mobile payments. Rapid growth 
rates for Alibaba, Ant Financial, and Tencent in China’s 
#nancial system indicate that Big Tech #rms could 
potentially dominate major segments of our #nan-
cial industry if they are allowed to establish “in-house 
banks” and exploit their technological advantages. 
Financial regulators around the world are just begin-
ning to grapple with a wide array of public policy issues 
raised by the potential entry of Big Tech #rms into the 
banking industry. Those issues include concerns about 
unfair competition, the enforceability of limits on shar-
ing of customer data, the protection of privacy rights 
in customer #nancial and health information, as well as 
operational and systemic risks created by combinations 
between banks and large technology #rms.80
The FDIC and OCC should not preempt the ongo-
ing consideration of these vitally important issues by 
allowing large technology #rms to acquire ILCs and 
nondepository #ntech national banks. Such acquisitions 
would create intense pressures on Congress to remove 
all of the BHC Act’s restrictions on joint ownership 
of banks and commercial #rms. Big Tech giants would 
not be satis#ed with making “toehold” acquisitions of 
ILCs or #ntech “banks.” They would want to establish 
a stronger competitive presence in the #nancial indus-
try by acquiring large full-service banks. Conversely, 
big banks would demand that Congress create a “level 
playing #eld” by allowing banks to acquire technology 
#rms. Thus, allowing large technology #rms to acquire 
ILCs and nondepository #ntech national banks would 
almost certainly lead to legislation permitting large-
scale combinations between Big Tech giants and big 
banks. Those combinations would magnify the exces-
sive levels of concentration, the lack of e!ective com-
petition, the “too big to fail” status, and the unhealthy 
political in$uence that our technology giants and mega-
banks already leverage to their bene#t. Such outcomes 
would be contrary to the public interest factors that the 
FDIC, the OCC, and other bank regulators are required 
to consider under the FDI Act.81
As discussed above, Big Tech giants and other com-
mercial #rms that acquire ILCs and nondepository #n-
tech national banks would not be subject to regulation 
by the Fed under the BHC Act. The FDIC and the 
OCC could not exercise the type of consolidated, com-
prehensive supervision over commercial owners of ILCs 
and #ntech “banks” that the Fed exercises over bank 
holding companies under the BHC Act. For example, 
the FDIC and OCC could not conduct unlimited, 
full-scope examinations of commercial parent com-
panies and their nonbank subsidiaries. In addition, the 
FDIC and OCC could not impose consolidated cap-
ital requirements and liquidity requirements on com-
mercial parent companies, nor could they require those 
companies to undergo stress tests and resolution plan-
ning exercises that large bank holding companies must 
complete.82
The Wirecard debacle illustrates the great danger 
of allowing the FDIC and OCC to regulate ILCs or 
#ntech “banks” without possessing comprehensive, 
consolidated supervisory authority over those institu-
tions’ parent companies and other nonbank a"liates. 
Felix Hufeld, president of BaFin (Germany’s #nancial 
regulatory agency) told the Bundestag (Germany’s fed-
eral legislature) that BaFin did not uncover Wirecard’s 
accounting fraud because BaFin lacked authority to 
supervise Wirecard and its complex global network of 
nonbank subsidiaries. Hufeld explained that BaFin’s 
“ability to act was limited because Wirecard was clas-
si#ed as a technology company rather than a #nancial 
services provider, and so was not fully under BaFin’s 
purview. The agency only oversaw Wirecard Bank,” a 
deposit-taking bank that Wirecard owned.83
The Wirecard scandal also demonstrates that #nan-
cial regulators cannot rely on external auditors to 
police large #rms with complex #nancial operations. 
Ernst & Young reportedly overlooked numerous indi-
cators of fraud at Wirecard, just as Arthur Andersen 
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failed to identify pervasive fraud at Enron. Both audit-
ing #rms were subject to intense pressure from their 
clients not to pursue evidence of fraud.84 A prominent 
#nancial journalist described the Wirecard scandal as 
“an Enron moment for today’s #nancial technology 
sector.”85
Even if Congress granted the FDIC and OCC con-
solidated supervisory authority over commercial own-
ers of ILCs and #ntech “banks,” that authority would 
not remove the grave threats posed by commercial-#-
nancial conglomerates. Any federal banking agency 
would face enormous logistical challenges in attempt-
ing to oversee complex and highly diversi#ed commer-
cial-#nancial enterprises, including the need to hire 
personnel with expertise in many di!erent commercial 
sectors of the U.S. economy. The catastrophic failures by 
federal #nancial agencies to supervise large bank hold-
ing companies and “shadow banks” e!ectively prior to 
the #nancial crisis of 2007–09 should persuade us that 
federal regulators would have an even lower probability 
of success in supervising far-$ung commercial-#nancial 
conglomerates.86
Big Tech giants and other large commercial owners 
of ILCs and #ntech “banks” would inevitably be con-
sidered “too big to fail” by both regulators and market 
participants. Their “too big to fail” status, their extensive 
lobbying resources, and their political in$uence would 
also make them “too big to regulate e!ectively.” Thus, 
any attempt to establish a rigorous system of consol-
idated supervision for commercial-#nancial conglom-
erates would almost certainly fail. The unfeasibility of 
consolidated supervision for enterprises spanning bank-
ing and commerce provides a further compelling reason 
for prohibiting their existence.87
2. The OCC’s and FDIC’s attempts to confer 
the benefits of federal preemption on 
nonbanks violate federal laws and pose serious 
threats to consumers and small businesses
As described in the Introduction, the OCC’s and 
FDIC’s recent rulemakings seek to extend the bene-
#ts of federal preemption to nonbanks that either (1) 
acquire loans from federally-chartered and federally-in-
sured banks, or (2) establish lending “partnerships” with 
such banks. The OCC’s and FDIC’s rules violate federal 
statutes and are likely to in$ict serious injuries on con-
sumers, small businesses, and communities.
a. Federal laws prohibit the OCC and FDIC from 
expanding the scope of federal preemption to 
benefit nonbanks
i. The OCC’s and FDIC’s usury preemption transfer rules 
are unlawful
Since 1864, Section 85 of the NBA has governed 
the “interest” that a national bank may “take, receive, 
reserve, and charge” on its loans. The “interest” allowed 
to a national bank under Section 85 is determined by 
the usury laws of the state where the bank is “located.” 
Section 85 gives national banks preemptive immunity 
from the usury laws of other states. As noted above, most 
national banks “locate” their lending operations in states 
that impose few if any restrictions on the “interest” they 
can charge.88
The OCC’s usury preemption transfer rule exceeds 
the agency’s authority by expanding Section 85’s scope 
of preemption to include nonbank purchasers, assignees, 
and other transferees of loans made by national banks.89 
Section 85’s text makes clear that the power to charge 
“interest” thereunder is granted only to national banks 
and does not extend to nonbanks that acquire loans 
from national banks. Less than a decade after Congress 
enacted the NBA, the Supreme Court held that Section 
85 was intended “to allow to National associations the rate 
allowed by the State to natural persons generally, and a 
higher rate, if State banks of issue were authorized to 
charge a higher rate.”90 A century later, the Supreme 
Court’s Marquette decision stated that Section 85 pro-
vides the terms on which “a national bank may charge 
interest.”91 The Court also explained that its decision in 
Marquette—which allowed a national bank to “export” to 
borrowers in other states the interest rate allowed by the 
state where the bank was “located”—did not extend to 
the bank’s nondepository subsidiary or to other persons 
with whom the bank had contractual relationships.92
In 1980, Congress enacted 12 U.S.C. §§ 1463(g)(1) 
and 1831d, which give federal savings associations and 
FDIC-insured, state-chartered depository institutions 
“parity, or competitive equality” with national banks in 
terms of the “interest” they may charge on their loans.93 
Congress intended that Sections 1463(g) and 1831d 
would “provide federally-insured credit institutions 
with the same ‘most-favored-lender’ status enjoyed by 
national banks.”94 The preemptive immunity granted 
by Sections 1463(g) and 1831d applies only to “interest” 
that is lawfully charged by federal savings associations 
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and FDIC-insured, state-chartered depository institu-
tions. The preemptive scope of those two statutes is the 
same as Section 85, which applies only to “interest” law-
fully charged by national banks.95
Sections 1463(g) and 1831d were enacted as part of 
Section 521 of the Depository Institutions Deregulation 
and Monetary Control Act of 1980 (DIDMCA).96 Like 
Section 85, Sections 1463(g) and 1831d do not include 
any reference to the right of a federally-chartered or 
federally-insured depository institution to transfer its 
preemptive immunity from state usury laws to purchas-
ers, assignees, and other transferees of its loans.
In contrast, 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a—enacted as part 
of Section 501 of DIDMCA—preempts state usury 
laws from applying to originations and “credit sales” of 
#rst-lien residential mortgages that qualify as “federally 
related mortgage loans” under 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-5(b). 
Congress intended that the preemption provided by 
Section 501 would apply to both originations and sales 
of qualifying #rst-lien residential mortgages. Congress 
wanted to “facilitate a national housing policy and the 
functioning of a national secondary market in mortgage 
lending.”97 Congress therefore made clear that qualify-
ing #rst-lien residential mortgages would continue to 
receive the bene#t of Section 501’s preemption of state 
usury laws if they were sold to investors who were not 
“eligible lenders” for such mortgages.98
Thus, the preemption authorized by Section 501 of 
DIMCA covers purchasers of qualifying #rst-lien resi-
dential mortgages. In contrast, the preemption authorized 
by Section 521 of DIDMCA—which enacted Sections 
1463(g) and 1831d—does not refer to purchasers of loans 
covered by those statutes. The Supreme Court has repeat-
edly held that Congress is presumed to act “intention-
ally and purposely” when “it includes particular language 
in one section of a statute but omits it in another sec-
tion of the same Act.”99 That presumption is especially 
strong when the two statues were enacted “simultane-
ously” by the “same Congress,” as Sections 501 and 521 
of DIDMCA were in 1980.100 It must therefore be pre-
sumed that Congress acted “intentionally and purpose-
fully” when it did not make any reference to purchasers of 
nonmortgage loans in Section 521 of DIDMCA.
The absence of any reference to purchasers of loans 
in Section 521 of DIDMCA supports the conclusion 
that the preemption provided by 12 U.S.C. § 85—the 
historical model for Section 521—also does not extend 
to purchasers of similar loans made by national banks.101 
That conclusion is further bolstered by the Alternative 
Mortgage Transactions Parity Act, 12 U.S.C. §§ 3801-
06 (AMTPA), which was enacted only two years after 
DIDMCA. Under 12 U.S.C. § 3803, “housing credi-
tors” (including state-chartered, nondepository lenders) 
can “make, purchase, and enforce alternative mortgage 
transactions” in accordance with AMTPA, regardless of 
contrary state laws. Thus, the scope of AMTPA’s pre-
emption expressly extends to purchasers of qualifying 
alternative mortgages, in the same way that the pre-
emptive scope of Section 501 of DIDMCA includes 
purchasers of qualifying #rst-lien residential mortgages. 
Section 501 of DIDMCA and AMTPA show that 
Congress knew how to make its intention clear when 
it wanted to extend preemptive immunity to purchasers 
of loans.
The preemption standards for national banks under 
12 U.S.C. § 25b (enacted in 2010) reinforce the con-
clusion that Sections 85 does not provide preemptive 
immunity to purchasers, assignees, and other transferees 
of loans made by national banks. Under Sections 25b(b)
(2), (e), and (h)(2), state laws apply to subsidiaries, a"l-
iates, and agents of national banks to the same extent 
as they apply to any other person subject to those state 
laws, unless the subsidiary, a"liate, or agent is itself char-
tered as a national bank.102 Similarly, state laws apply to 
subsidiaries, a"liates, and agents of federal savings asso-
ciations pursuant to 12 U.S.C. § 1465(a), which estab-
lishes equivalent preemption standards for federal thrifts.
The foregoing provisions of Section 25b overruled 
several court decisions that were issued before 2010 
and expanded the NBA’s preemptive scope to cover 
nonbank subsidiaries and agents of national banks.103 
In light of Section 25b’s explicit denial of NBA pre-
emption to nonbank subsidiaries, a"liates, and agents 
of national banks, the OCC’s usury preemption trans-
fer rule is untenable. Purchasers and assignees of loans 
are counterparties to contracts with national banks and 
federal thrifts, just as subsidiaries, a"liates, and agents 
are. The OCC cannot grant to purchasers and assign-
ees of loans a preemptive immunity that Congress has 
expressly denied to other types of contract counterpar-
ties that have closer relationships to national banks and 
federal thrifts.
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Section 25b(f) provides further evidence of Congress’s 
intent not to expand Section 85’s preemption of state 
usury laws beyond national banks. Section 25b(f) pre-
serves only “the authority conferred by section 85 . . . 
for the charging of interest by a national bank” from 
the preemption framework established by Section 25b 
(discussed below in Part 2.b). Like Section 85, Section 
25b(f) does not refer to purchasers, assignees, or other 
transferees of loans made by national banks. Federal sav-
ings associations are governed by the same limited scope 
of preemption under 12 U.S.C. § 1465(a).
The OCC has acknowledged that its expansion of 
preemptive immunity to cover nonbanks that acquire 
loans from national banks is not based on any language 
“expressly stated” in Sections 85 and 1463(g).104 The 
OCC has also admitted that its rule is contrary to the 
decision of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in 
Madden v. Midland Funding. The Second Circuit held 
that usury preemption under Section 85 did not apply 
to a debt collector that purchased loans from a national 
bank. The Second Circuit concluded that extend-
ing Section 85 to cover debt collectors would be an 
“overly broad application” of the NBA and “would 
create an end-run around usury laws for non-national 
bank entities that are not acting on behalf of a national 
bank.”105
The OCC contends that its usury preemption trans-
fer rule is supported by “common-law” principles of 
“valid-when-made and the assignability of contracts,” 
which the OCC has derived from court decisions dat-
ing back to the 19th century. The OCC says that it is 
“not citing these tenets as independent authority for 
this rulemaking but rather as tenets of common law 
that inform its reasonable interpretation of section 
85.”106
The OCC cannot rely on common-law “tenets” 
extracted from past federal court decisions to expand 
the preemptive scope of federal statutes. Since 1938, the 
Supreme Court has made clear that “[t]here is no fed-
eral general common law.”107 The Supreme Court has 
repeatedly held that “cases in which judicial creation of 
a special federal [common law] rule would be justi#ed 
. . . are . . . ‘few and restricted.’”108 The Supreme Court 
has twice struck down attempts by the FDIC to invoke 
federal common-law rules as a justi#cation for expand-
ing the preemptive scope of the FDI Act.
In its 1997 Atherton decision, the Supreme Court 
held that the FDIC could not rely on an alleged “fed-
eral common law” duty of ordinary care for bank 
directors and o"cers to expand the preemptive scope 
of 12 U.S.C. § 1821(k). Section 1821(k) imposes lia-
bility on directors and o"cers of FDIC-insured banks 
for gross negligence. The statute is silent on the ques-
tion of whether the FDIC can impose liability on bank 
directors and o"cers for simple negligence if applicable 
state laws do not create a duty of ordinary care. The 
FDIC claimed that it could impose liability for simple 
negligence under a “federal common law” rule dating 
from the 19th century, even if applicable state laws did 
not prescribe liability for simple negligence. The Court 
rejected the FDIC’s claim and held that “state law, not 
federal common law, provides the applicable rules for 
decision,” except where Section 1821(k) preempted 
state law by stipulating a gross negligence standard. The 
Court pointed out that “federally chartered banks are 
subject to state law,” and “a federal charter by itself shows 
no con$ict, threat, or need for ‘federal common law.’”109
In its 1993 O’Melveny & Myers decision, the Supreme 
Court rejected a similar preemption claim by the FDIC. 
The FDIC alleged that a law #rm was liable for neg-
ligence and breach of #duciary duty due to its mal-
practice in representing a failed thrift institution. The 
FDIC argued, based on a “federal common-law rule,” 
that the law #rm could not defend itself by imputing 
the knowledge of corporate o"cers to the thrift or to 
the FDIC as the thrift’s receiver. Again, Section 1821 
was silent regarding any imputation of knowledge from 
corporate o"cers to their institution and the FDIC. In 
contrast, applicable state laws did impute the knowledge 
of those o"cers to both the thrift and the FDIC. After 
reviewing the “comprehensive and detailed” provisions 
of Section 1821, the Court determined that “matters 
left unaddressed in such a scheme are presumably left to 
the disposition provided by state law.” The Court held 
that Section 1821 “places the FDIC in the shoes of the 
insolvent S&L, to work out its claims under state law, 
except where some provision in the extensive frame-
work of [Section 1821] provides otherwise. To create 
additional ‘federal common-law’ exceptions is not to ‘supple-
ment’ this scheme, but to alter it.”110
The OCC’s reliance on alleged common-law 
“tenets” to expand the preemptive scope of 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 85 and 1463(g) is invalid for the same reasons that the 
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Supreme Court rejected the FDIC’s reliance on “federal 
common law” rules in Atherton and O’Melveny & Myers. 
The OCC’s usury preemption transfer rule applies to 
transactions between private parties (national banks and 
nonbank purchasers, assignees, and other transferees of 
their loans). The OCC’s rule does not implicate the 
rights, liabilities, or duties of the United States or its 
agencies, o"cials, or contractors, and it also does not 
involve U.S. foreign relations or admiralty matters. The 
Supreme Court has held that application of a federal 
common-law rule is not justi#ed when “private parties,” 
including national banks, are involved in a dispute relat-
ing to a “private transaction” that “does not touch the 
rights and duties of the United States.”111
There is an additional reason why the OCC can-
not rely on purported common-law “tenets” to expand 
the preemptive scope of Sections 85 and 1463(g). In 
determining whether federal statutes preempt state 
authority in a traditional #eld of state regulation, such 
as consumer protection, federal courts “start with the 
assumption that the historic police powers of the States 
were not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless 
that was the clear and manifest purpose of Congress.”112 
Accordingly, “compelling evidence of [Congress’s] 
intention to preempt” is required” before courts will 
conclude that a federal statute preempts state consumer 
protection laws.113
There is no “compelling evidence” of any “clear and 
manifest purpose of Congress” to expand the scope of 
usury preemption under Sections 85 and 1463(g) to 
cover nonbanks that acquire loans made by national 
banks and federal thrifts. On the contrary, as shown 
above, the express terms of Sections 85 and 1463(g) 
apply only to “interest” that is lawfully “charge[d]” 
by national banks and federal thrifts. When Congress 
wanted to extend usury preemption to reach purchas-
ers of qualifying mortgage loans under DIDMCA and 
AMTPA, Congress made its intention abundantly clear.
The FDIC has acknowledged that 12 U.S.C. § 
1831d “is patterned after section 85 and receives the 
same interpretation as section 85.”114 Consequently, the 
FDIC’s authority to preempt state usury laws under 
Section 1831d is no broader than the OCC’s author-
ity under Section 85 and does not extend to nonbanks 
that acquire loans from FDIC-insured state banks. The 
OCC’s and FDIC’s usury preemption transfer rules 
plainly exceed the agencies’ statutory authority, and 
both rules are invalid.115
ii. The OCC’s proposed “true lender” rule is 
unlawful and would allow national banks to 
form “rent-a-charter” schemes with predatory 
nonbank lenders
Under the OCC’s proposed “true lender” rule, 
a national bank or federal thrift would be deemed 
to “make” a loan if the institution, “as of the date of 
origination,” is either “named as the lender in the loan 
agreement” or “[f]unds the loan.”116 The proposed rule 
is designed to “operate together” with the OCC’s usury 
preemption transfer rule.117 Working in tandem, those 
rules would permit national banks and federal thrifts 
to form “partnerships” with nonbank lenders. Nonbank 
lenders that acquire loans through such “partnerships” 
would be given preemptive immunity from state usury 
laws, even if their bank “partners” did not retain any 
meaningful credit risk or other economic risks related 
to those loans. The bank “partners” could act as mere 
conduits by quickly transferring loans to their nonbank 
“partners,” and the nonbank “partners” could assume all 
of the economic risks, dictate the terms, and control the 
enforcement of those loans. Such “partnerships” would 
amount to “rent-a-charter” schemes, which the OCC 
barred national banks from entering during the early 
2000s.118
The OCC’s proposed “true lender” rule would 
potentially preempt not only state usury laws but also a 
wide range of other state laws—including state licens-
ing, examination, and consumer protection laws—that 
would otherwise apply to nonbank lenders that form 
“partnerships” with national banks. For example, a loan 
that is deemed to be “made” by a national bank under 
either of the proposed rule’s two tests would presumably 
be covered by the OCC’s sweeping claims of preemp-
tion of state law under 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008 (for loans 
“made” by national banks that are not secured by real 
estate) or 12 C.F.R. § 34.4 (for real estate loans “made” 
by national banks), even if the bank subsequently trans-
fers the loan to its nonbank “partner.” The proposed 
rule’s potential scope of preemption therefore embraces 
a very broad array of state laws.119
The OCC has acknowledged that federal statutes, 
including 12 U.S.C. §§ 85 and 1463(g), “do not spe-
ci#cally address which entity makes a loan (or, in the 
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vernacular commonly used in case law, which entity is 
the ‘true lender’),” and federal statutes also do not stip-
ulate “what legal framework applies, when the loan is 
originated as part of a lending relationship between a 
bank and a third party.” The OCC has also admitted that 
none of the federal statutes authorizing national banks 
to make contracts and loans “describes how to deter-
mine when a bank has, in fact, exercised this authority, 
and when, by contrast, the bank’s relationship partner 
has made the loan.”120 Thus, the OCC has conceded 
that its proposed tests for determining “true lender” sta-
tus are not supported by any explicit statutory language.
The proposed rule also ignores the fact that state laws 
govern contracts made by national banks unless a par-
ticular state law creates an irreconcilable con$ict with a 
federal statute. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held 
that national banks
are subject to the laws of the State, and are gov-
erned in their daily course of business far more 
by the laws of the State than of the nation. All 
their contracts are governed and construed by State laws. 
Their acquisition and transfer of property, their 
right to collect their debts, and their liability to be 
sued for debts, are all based on State law.121
Similarly, the Supreme Court a"rmed in 2009 that 
“States . . . have always enforced their general laws against 
national banks – and have enforced their banking-re-
lated laws against national banks for at least 85 years.”122
Contracts for loans are subject to state usury laws as 
well as general state contract laws. State usury laws are 
valid exercises of the states’ historic police power to pro-
tect their residents from abusive and exploitative lend-
ing practices.123 Because usury is a traditional #eld of 
state regulation, federal courts have refused to infer from 
statutory silence that Congress intended to preempt 
state usury laws.124 As shown above, Congress has not 
expressed any intention to preempt “true lender” doc-
trines that are a key aspect of many state usury laws.125
Federal courts have repeatedly held that Section 
85 incorporates the entire usury jurisprudence of the 
relevant state, including that state’s usury statutes and 
the interpretations of those statutes by state courts.126 
Federal and state courts have also held that usury claims 
should be determined based on the “substance” of the 
relevant transactions and not their legal “form.” In an 
1835 decision, the Supreme Court declared—in an 
opinion by Chief Justice John Marshall—that an alleged 
violation of usury laws should be evaluated based on 
“the substance of the transaction and the true intent and 
meaning of the parties, for they alone are to govern, and 
not the words used.”127 Other courts have similarly eval-
uated usury claims against national banks by “look[ing] 
behind the form of a transaction to its substance” in 
accordance with state usury laws.128
Several courts have applied a substance-over-form 
analysis in determining whether nonbank lenders were 
the “true lenders” when they claimed to act as “part-
ners” or “agents” of national banks or FDIC-insured 
state banks. Those courts rejected claims that the non-
bank lenders were entitled to preemptive immunity 
under Section 85 or Section 1831d by reason of their 
status as “partners” or “agents” of banks. The courts held 
that the nonbank lenders should be treated as the “true 
lenders” if they held the “predominant economic inter-
est” in the loans. In determining which party had the 
“predominant economic interest,” the courts considered 
several factors, including which party bore the greatest 
amount of credit risk under the loans, which party dic-
tated the terms and controlled the enforcement of the 
loans, and whether the nonbank lender indemni#ed its 
“partner” bank.129
The OCC’s proposed rule is contrary to the fore-
going court decisions and would preempt state “true 
lender” laws without any statutory authority. The pro-
posed rule would create a conclusive, in$exible, and 
highly formalistic standard for determining the “true 
lender” for loans produced by “partnerships” between 
national banks and nonbank lenders. The proposed rule 
would consider only two narrow factors—whether 
the national bank was named as the lender in the loan 
agreements or funded the loans for at least one day. Thus, 
the proposed rule would grant preemptive immunity to 
nonbank lenders from a wide range of state laws, even 
if those lenders held the “predominant economic inter-
est” in loans produced by “partnerships” with national 
banks.
The OCC’s proposed rule would legitimize 
“rent-a-charter” schemes between national banks (or 
federal thrifts) and high-cost nonbank lenders. “Rent-
a-charter” schemes are designed to prevent states from 
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enforcing their usury laws and other consumer protec-
tion laws against high-cost nonbank lenders, includ-
ing payday lenders and auto title lenders. Those lenders 
impose very high-interest charges on consumers and 
small businesses, with annual percentage rates that often 
exceed 100%. Loans made by high-cost nonbank lend-
ers produce staggering rates of delinquency and default 
among borrowers. For example, Elevate, a high-cost 
lender that is a “partner” of several banks, reported 
charge-o! rates on its loans that exceeded 52% of its 
revenues in 2016 and 2017. Similarly, more than one-
#fth of borrowers who take out auto title loans even-
tually lose their cars through default and repossession. 
Predatory high-cost nonbank lenders typically focus 
their marketing campaigns on communities with rel-
atively high percentages of vulnerable minority and 
lower-income households.130
In the early 2000s, the OCC recognized the dan-
gers created by “rent-a-charter” partnerships between 
national banks and nonbank payday lenders. The OCC 
took decisive action to shut down those schemes.131 
The OCC issued enforcement orders that required four 
national banks (Eagle National Bank, First National 
Bank of Brookings, Goleta National Bank, and Peoples 
National Bank of Paris, Texas) to stop making payday 
loans and to terminate their “rent-a-charter” ventures 
with nonbank lenders.
In January 2002, the OCC issued an enforcement 
order against Eagle National Bank after determining 
that Eagle’s payday lending partnership with Dollar 
Financial Group “risked [Eagle’s] #nancial viabil-
ity” and violated “a multitude of standards of safe and 
sound banking, compliance requirements, and OCC 
guidance.” The OCC declared that Eagle’s joint ven-
ture with Dollar “demonstrates the dangers inherent in 
arrangements under which national banks rent out their 
charters to nonbank providers of #nancial services . . . . 
[Eagle] e!ectively collaborated in Dollar’s scheme to 
evade state law requirements that would otherwise be 
applicable to it.”132
In announcing a similar enforcement order against 
Peoples National Bank in January 2003, Comptroller of 
the Currency John D. Hawke, Jr. stated:
We have been greatly concerned with arrange-
ments in which national banks essentially rent out 
their charters to third parties who want to evade 
state and local consumer protection laws . . . . The 
preemption privileges of national banks derive from the 
Constitution and are not a commodity that can be trans-
ferred for a fee to nonbank lenders.133
In a speech delivered in February 2002, Comptroller 
Hawke warned that “rent-a-charter” schemes threat-
ened to undermine the “safety and soundness” of 
national banks and represented “an abuse of the national 
charter.” He condemned such schemes as illegitimate 
because
[t]he bene#t that national banks enjoy by reason 
of this important constitutional doctrine [of pre-
emption] cannot be treated as a piece of disposable 
property that a bank may rent out to a third party 
that is not a national bank. Preemption is not like 
excess space in a bank-owned o!ce building. It is an 
inalienable right of the bank itself.134
Thus, the OCC established a strong policy in the 
early 2000s of prohibiting national banks from trans-
ferring their preemptive immunity to nonbank payday 
lenders through “rent-a-charter” schemes. As shown by 
the OCC’s website, that policy has remained in e!ect—
at least formally—until now.135 The OCC’s enforcement 
orders from the early 2000s provide compelling evi-
dence of the injuries that the OCC’s usury preemp-
tion transfer rule and proposed “true lender” rule are 
likely to in$ict on our banking system and the public. 
Those injuries include: undermining the states’ long-
standing authority to protect their residents from pred-
atory nonbank lenders, threatening the #nancial and 
reputational soundness of national banks, encouraging 
reckless lending practices, and facilitating e!orts by 
predatory nonbank lenders to exploit consumers and 
small businesses with exorbitant interest rates and fees, 
deceptive marketing practices, privacy violations, abu-
sive debt collection practices, and other unconscionable 
conduct.136
By enabling predatory lending and impairing the 
states’ authority to protect their residents, the OCC’s 
rules would violate fundamental purposes of the Dodd–
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act (Dodd–Frank).137 When Congress passed the 
Dodd–Frank Act in 2010, it strongly criticized federal 
#nancial regulators for failing to take e!ective measures 
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to stop predatory nonprime lending during the 1990s 
and 2000s. Congress also condemned the OCC and 
OTS for aggressively preempting e!orts by many states 
to stop predatory nonprime lending during the 1990s 
and 2000s.138
The OCC’s and OTS’s regulatory failures and 
unwarranted preemption of state laws were major fac-
tors behind Congress’s decisions to abolish the OTS 
and enact 12 U.S.C. § 25b, which imposes signi#cant 
constraints on the OCC’s authority to preempt state 
consumer #nancial laws.139 As shown in the next sec-
tion, the OCC has not complied with Section 25b and 
therefore has no legal authority to pursue its current 
preemption e!orts.
b. The OCC’s fintech charter and preemption 
rules violate Section 25b
Section 25b of the NBA, enacted as part of the Dodd–
Frank Act, establishes a new framework for determining 
whether state consumer #nancial laws apply to national 
banks and federal savings associations. Under Section 
25b(b)(1), a state consumer #nancial law is preempted 
“only if ” (A) the state law has “a discriminatory e!ect 
on national banks,” or (B) the state law “prevents or sig-
ni#cantly interferes with the exercise by the national 
bank of its powers,” or (C) the state law is preempted by 
a federal statute other than the NBA.140 Section 25b(b)
(1)(B) expressly incorporates the “prevent or signi#-
cantly interfere” standard for preemption established by 
the Supreme Court’s 1996 decision in Barnett Bank of 
Marion County, N.A. v. Nelson.141 Section 25b’s preemp-
tion framework for national banks also governs federal 
thrifts.142
Section 25b requires the OCC to demonstrate, with 
regard to each of its preemption rules and orders, that 
“substantial evidence, made on the record of the pro-
ceeding,” supports the OCC’s “speci#c #nding” of pre-
emption in accordance with Barnett Bank. The OCC 
must also act on a “case-by-case basis” when it issues a 
preemption rule or order. To satisfy the “case-by-case” 
requirement, the OCC must consider “the impact of a 
particular State consumer #nancial law on any national 
bank that is subject to that law, or the law of any other 
State with substantially equivalent terms.” In addi-
tion, the OCC must “#rst consult with the Bureau of 
Consumer Financial Protection and take the views of 
the Bureau into account” when the OCC makes its 
“case-by-case” determination.143
The OCC did not comply with Section 25b when it 
issued its nondepository #ntech national bank charter, 
its usury preemption transfer rule, and its proposed “true 
lender” rule. The OCC did not explain how any of those 
three measures conformed to Section 25b’s “prevents or 
signi#cantly interferes” preemption standard or Section 
25b’s “substantial evidence” requirement or its “case-by-
case” mandate. Indeed, the OCC did not even attempt 
to ful#ll Section 25b’s requirements when it adopted 
those three measures.144
The OCC claimed that its usury preemption transfer 
rule fell “outside of the scope of section 25b because 
of section 25b(f).”145 However, that assertion is clearly 
erroneous. As shown above, Section 25b(f) provides 
that Section 25b’s preemption framework does not 
a!ect “the authority conferred by [Section 85] for the 
charging of interest by a national bank” (emphasis added). 
Section 25b(f) did not relieve the OCC from its duty 
to comply with Section 25b’s requirements when the 
OCC sought to expand Section 85’s preemptive scope 
to cover nonbank purchasers, assignees, and transferees 
of loans made by national banks. The OCC’s rule went 
far beyond the exemption provided by Section 25b(f), 
which applies only to the “charging of interest by a 
national bank.”146
The OCC’s recent actions are the latest examples of 
the agency’s repeated failures to comply with Section 25b. 
When Congress passed the Dodd–Frank Act in 2010, it 
rejected the sweeping preemption rules that the OCC 
issued in 2004. The Senate committee report stated that, 
under Section 25b, “[t]he standard for preempting State 
consumer #nancial law would return to what it had been 
for decades, those recognized by the Supreme Court in 
Barnett Bank v. Nelson, 517 U.S. 25 (1996) (Barnett), undo-
ing broader standards adopted by rules, orders, and inter-
pretations issued by the OCC in 2004.”147
In 2011, the OCC revised several of its preemption 
rules, purportedly to bring them into conformity with 
Section 25b.148 However, the OCC’s revised rules do 
not include the “prevent or signi#cantly interfere” pre-
emption standard established by Barnett Bank, despite 
Congress’s express incorporation of that standard in 12 
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U.S.C. § 25b(b)(1)(B). In de#ance of Congress’s explicit 
mandate, the OCC asserted that “the Dodd-Frank Act 
does not create a new stand-alone ‘prevents or signi#-
cantly interferes’ preemption standard.”149
Three of the revised preemption rules that the 
OCC issued in 2011—12 C.F.R. §§ 7.4007, 7.4008, 
and 34.4—continue to declare that broad categories 
of state laws are preempted across the nation. When 
the OCC issued those sweeping and categorical pre-
emption rules in 2011, the OCC did not comply with 
Section 25b’s “substantial evidence” and “case-by-case” 
requirements. The OCC claimed that it did not need 
to comply with Section 25b’s requirements because its 
blanket preemption rules were based on similar pre-
emption rules it adopted in 2004. The OCC asserted 
that its “regulations in e!ect prior to the e!ective date 
[of Dodd-Frank] are not subject to the case-by-case 
requirement.”150
The OCC’s claim that its 2004 rules remained valid 
after 2010—even though they did not comply with 
Section 25b’s requirements—is indefensible. Under 
Section 25b(b)(1), state consumer #nancial laws are 
preempted “only if ” a federal agency or court makes 
a preemption determination in compliance with all of 
the requirements of Section 25b. Section 1043 of the 
Dodd–Frank Act provides a very limited exception to 
that mandate. Section 1043 preserves the applicability 
of previous OCC regulations and orders to “any con-
tract entered into [by a national bank or its subsidiary] 
before July 21, 2010” (the date of Dodd–Frank’s enact-
ment).151 Congress intended that Section 1043 would 
“provide stability to existing contracts”—those entered 
into before Dodd–Frank’s enactment—by allowing those 
contracts to be governed by the OCC’s preexisting rules 
and orders.152
Section 1043’s carefully limited exception demon-
strates the unmistakable intention of Congress that 
the OCC’s preexisting preemption rules and orders 
would not apply to transactions by national banks after 
July 21, 2010, unless the OCC revised those rules and 
orders to bring them into full compliance with Section 
25b. The OCC’s claim that its 2004 preemption rules 
remained valid for new transactions after 2010 would 
render Section 1043 “meaningless, in violation of the 
‘endlessly repeated principle of statutory construc-
tion . . . that all words in a statute are to be assigned 
meaning, and that nothing therein is to be construed as 
surplusage.’”153 Accordingly, the OCC violated Section 
25b when it issued three blanket preemption rules in 
2011 that did not comply with Section 25b’s “pre-
vents or signi#cantly interferes” preemption standard, 
“case-by-case” requirement, and “substantial evidence” 
mandate.154
The OCC has also failed to comply with Section 
25b(d). That provision requires the OCC to “periodi-
cally conduct a review, though notice and public com-
ment, of each determination that a provision of Federal 
law preempts a State consumer #nancial law,” within #ve 
years after issuing that determination. After complet-
ing a preemption review, the OCC must issue a public 
notice describing the results of that review and submit 
a report to the House Financial Services Committee 
and the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and 
Urban A!airs. The OCC’s public notice and report 
must explain whether the OCC intends to continue, 
rescind, or amend the preemption determination it 
reviewed. The OCC has not conducted any preemption 
reviews pursuant to Section 25b(d), even though the 
OCC’s most important preemption rules were issued 
more than nine years ago, in July 2011. Several of the 
OCC’s other preemption rules are at least #fteen years 
old, and the OCC has not performed any preemption 
reviews of those rules.155
The Supreme Court has admonished the OCC that it 
cannot “pick and choose what portion of the law binds 
[it].”156 The OCC should abandon its nondepository 
#ntech charter initiative, rescind its usury preemption 
transfer rule, and withdraw its proposed “true lender” 
rule, in view of the OCC’s lack of authority to adopt 
those measures and their glaring lack of compliance 
with Section 25b. The OCC should also conduct pre-
emption reviews of all of its existing preemption rules 
and orders that are more than #ve years old, as required 
by Section 25b(d).
Conclusion
The OCC’s and FDIC’s attempts to confer the bene-
#ts and privileges of banks on nonbanks and commercial 
#rms violate federal banking laws, undermine funda-
mental public policies, and threaten to in$ict severe 
injuries on our #nancial system, economy, and society. 
Congress should overturn those measures or persuade 
the OCC and FDIC to abandon them.
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